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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1957
ful so as to support an action for conversion on the refusal to relinquish
possession by the defendant. The court also held that plaintiff could
bring the action as the owner of a one-half interest. But the court also
held that plaintiff was limited in damages to one-half the value of the
property and it was error to award the plaintiff the money value of the
entire property.
The court of appeals in a recent case reiterated the common law rule
that a bailee can sue for full damages and holds the overage as trustee





1957 proved to be a banner year for zoning ordinance litigation.
Krieger v. Cleveland' represents a typical case. The area was zoned for
residential two-family use. There were no non-conforming uses in the
area. Plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction to compel the building
commissioner to issue a permit for industrial use. Plaintiff advanced
the ingenious argument that the court should anticipate expansion and
consider future uses or needs in determining -the constitutionality of the
existing ordinance. The court rejected this argument and reiterated the
test of constitutionality to be the existing facts.
The Supreme Court of Ohio refused to recognize a zoning ordinance
as a vehicle to prohibit an existing undesirable, but nevertheless lawful,
use of realty.2 In the East Fairfield Coal Co. v. Booth case plaintiff
sought to enjoin the zoning inspector and township trustees from inter-
fering with strip mining and to declare unconstitutional the zoning ordi-
nance prohibiting strip mining anywhere in the township. Inasmuch
as the ordinance was passed subsequent to the commencement plaintiff's
operation under license,4 the ordinance was held to be unconstitutional
as to plaintiff. This case merits careful study as to the character of evi-
dence to prove the unconstitutionality of a zoning ordinance.
An important factor in determining the unconstitutionality of zoning
ordinances may be whether it is a township or municipal corporation
ordinance. In Yorkovitz v. Board of Township Trustees,5 plaintiff sought
to enjoin enforcement of an ordinance declaring an airport to be a nui-
sance per se. The court regarded the general state statutes favoring the
"OHIO JUR. 2d, Bailments S 38 (1954).
t Omo RIv. CODE § 2307.05.
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promotion of aviation as indicative of the public policy of Ohio,6 and
concluded that the General Assembly cannot be held to have delegated
to township officials the authority to adopt zoning resolutions which are
in contravention of general laws previously enacted by the General As-
sembly. The restricted authority of township trustees to enact such laws
was a paramount factor in the decision.7
An important question of damages in condemnation proceedings was
resolved in the case of Qaeen City Realty Co. v. Linzell.8 The trial court
refused to submit for consideration by the jury testimony as to the value
of an existing leasehold, with four years to run. The Ohio Supreme
Court affirmed and held that the compensation payable cannot exceed
the value of the real estate as a whole even though the value of the lease-
hold interest, plus the value of the landlord's reversionary interest, should
exceed the value of the real estate as a whole.9 The court carefully dis-
tinguished between the value of an existing leasehold, which is inad-
missible, and the reasonable rental value of the realty, which can be con-
sidered. Thus it is proper to have an expert testify as to the reasonable
rental value of the property; such testimony tends to prove the reason-
able value of the real estate as a whole.'0
An everyday practical problem is the obligation owed a real estate
broker who shows a house which is ultimately purchased by the prospect
directly. The law is well established that a broker is entitled to a com-
mission when he is a procuring cause of the sale. But the mere showing
of a house does not amount to a procuring cause. In Bauman v. lVorley,"
176 Ohio L. Abs. 356, 143 N.E.2d 142 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
'For an excellent discussion of the constitutional issues pertaining to zoning ordi-
nances, see Village of Eudid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Cleveland
Trust Co. v. Village of Brooklyn, 92 Ohio App. 351, 110 N.E.2d 440 (1952), ap-
peal dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 258, 108 N.E.2d 679 (1952).
a166 Ohio St. 379, 143 N.E.2d 309 (1957). See also Cleveland Builders Supply
Co. v. City of Garfield Heights, 102 Ohio App. 69, 136 N.E.2d 105 (1956).
•Oro REv. CODE §§ 1513.01-.99 regulating strip mining.
'166 Ohio St. 349, 142 N.E.2d 655 (1957).
'Omo REv. CODE § 4561.01-.99.
7 Oro REv. CODE § 519.02. Board of township trustees may regulate location, size
and use of buildings and lands.
' 166 Ohio St. 249, 142 N.E.2d 219 (1957).
'The question of damages in condemnation proceedings is thoroughly covered in
Sowers v. Schaeffer, 155 Ohio St. 454, 99 N.E.2d 313 (1951).
"'The issue as to the condemnor's liability for the property as a whole is not to be
confused with apportionment of the proceeds between lessor anl lessee. For this
purpose the value of the particular leasehold is of paramount importance. See City
of Columbus v. Huntington National Bank, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 215, 143 N.E.2d 874
(Ct. App. 1956), appeal dismissed, 166 Ohio St. 268 (1957), reviewed under the
Landlord-Tenant section of this survey.
'a 166 Ohio St. 471, 143 N.E.2d 820 (1957).
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the purchaser had solicited the services of the broker to locate for him a
home in the Cincinnati area. The purchaser discovered the property in
question, whereupon the seller gave the broker an open listing. The
broker brought no offer and conducted no negotiations; ultimately, the
purchaser consummated a direct purchase with the seller. There was no
evidence that the broker was prevented from negotiating the sale by the
fault of either party. Here the purchase was made at a time subsequent
to the initial showing by the broker, under circumstances uninfluenced
by the broker. The broker was therefore not the procuring cause and not
entitled to a commission.
Hunter v. Gro e 2 presents an even stronger case in which the broker
was denied a commission. The broker had actually consummated the
sale under an existing exclusive listing. The sale was contingent upon
the seller's purchase of another house, which fell through. All contracts
were thereupon rescinded, and the exclusive listing contract of the broker
was terminated. At a later date the seller was able to make satisfactory
arrangements to purchase, and he thereupon contacted his former pros-
pect directly. The sale was completed without the services of the broker.
Again the broker was held not to be the procuring cause.18
One last case is worthy of comment because of the frequency with
which the problem recurs. Plaintiff purchased a house under construc-
don. Upon completion he discovered that the sewer from the house to
the sewer main was improperly constructed and tested. Subsequently the
basement was flooded and furniture and carpeting was damaged. Plaintiff
was forced to expend money to abate the fault and to restore the premises.
The court held that the bargain implied in law between the seller and buyer
was the completion of the entire house in such a way that it would be rea-
sonably fit for its intended use, and that the work would be done in a rea-
sonably efficient and workmanlike manner.14 A money judgment for
plaintiff was affirmed. The court noted, however, that it is still the law
of Ohio that in the absence of an express warranty the vendor of a com-
pleted house is under no obligation with regard to the condition of the
house, where no work is in progress and no work is to be done.'5
MARSHALL I. N-mruENRG
2102 Ohio App. 571, 115 N.E.2d 419 (1953). Cf. Kalina v. Fialko, 102 Ohio
App: 442, 125 N.E.2d 565 (1955); (broker held not to be a procuring cause).
" The broker must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he was the procuring
cause to be entitled to a commission. See Rabkin v. Calhoun, 83 Ohio App. 222,
81 N.E.2d 241 (1948).
"'Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
'There appears to be a duty of the vendor to speak as to known latent defects but
not as to patent defects. See Traverse v. Long, 165 Ohio St. 249, 135 N.E.2d 256
(1956).
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